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Abstract In this paper, we aim to assess the extent to which individual-level
completed fertility varies across contexts characterized by policies supporting dif-
ferent gender division of labor models. We examine key labor market and care
policies that shape gender relations in households and in the public domain. We also
consider the role of gender norms, which can act as both a moderator and a con-
founding factor for policy effects. We hypothesize that, by facilitating role com-
patibility and reducing the gendered costs of childrearing, policies that support
gender equality lead to an increase in fertility levels and to a reduction in fertility
differentials by the level of education. Using individual-level data from the Euro-
pean Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions for 16 countries, combined
with country-level data, we analyze completed fertility through multilevel Poisson’s
models. We find that the national level of childcare coverage is positively associated
with fertility. Family allowances, prevalence of women’s part-time employment and
length of paid leaves were also found to be positively associated with completed
fertility, though the associations were not statistically significant. These variables
show a significant positive pattern according to education. A high number of
average working hours for men are negatively associated with completed fertility
and show a strong negative pattern by educational level. The prevalence of gender-
egalitarian norms is highly predictive of fertility levels, yet we found no consistent
evidence of a weaker association of gender-equality policies in countries where
egalitarian values are less prevalent.
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1 Introduction
Gender systems are increasingly recognized as a critical component in explanations
of fertility levels and differentials, in both advanced and less economically
advanced societies (Bernhardt 1993; Folbre 1994; Joshi 1998; Rindfuss and
Brewster 1996; Mason 1997; McDonald 2000a, b; Neyer et al. 2013; Esping-
Andersen and Billari 2015). Different dimensions of the gender system, including
divisions of labor, power and norms, have been related to fertility patterns, and
several contributions highlight the key role of social institutions and their close
relationship with the gender relations models that exist in different societies.
A growing number of empirical studies have complemented this theoretical
literature, generally supporting it, but some contradicting and inconclusive results
have also been reported. Though several studies have carefully analyzed the
influence of the gender division of labor in households as well as the influence of
gender attitudes (e.g., Torr and Short 2004; Ola´h 2003; Cooke 2004; Brodmann
et al. 2007; Mencarini and Tanturri 2004; Mills et al. 2008; Goldscheider et al.
2013), other dimensions of gender relations, such as women’s capacity to form
independent households or the relative level of resources and their connection to
fertility, have received less attention (Neyer et al. 2013).
Some have also focused on the links between contextual variables and fertility
levels. For instance, Myrskyla (2011) contends that the existing positive link
between high human development and the total fertility rate is explained by gender-
equality levels. Society levels of gender (in)equality have been further explored by
Mills (2010), using a variety of macro-level equality indices, with results showing
little or no impact on fertility intentions and behavior in European countries. The
extensive literature on the impact of family policies on fertility has also provided
important insights (see Gauthier 2007; Hoem 2008; The´venon and Gauthier 2011,
for reviews). However, though some elements of the gender perspective have
sometimes been taken into account (Neyer and Andersson 2008; Billingsley and
Ferrarini 2014), in most cases, this literature is not based on gender theory.
There is a surprising lack of analyses of the fertility effects of ‘‘gender policies,’’
i.e., government programs that support particular gender relations models. These
programs include regulations and welfare provisions, which structure the relative
roles of families, markets and the state. In this paper, we link gendered perspectives
on the welfare state with demographic theories on the influence of gender relations
on fertility patterns. More specifically, because labor market institutions and ‘‘social
care’’ are crucial in shaping gender relations (Lewis 1998; Gornick and Meyers
2003; Pettit and Hook 2009; Esping-Andersen 2009; Korpi et al. 2013; Keck and
Saraceno 2013), we examine whether and how polices that influence the gender
division of labor inside and outside the household are associated with completed
fertility at the individual level.
It is important to acknowledge that policies are likely to have heterogeneous
effects in the population. Differentials by social class, ethnicity or education are
seldom analyzed, thus blurring those effects. Here we examine educational level
differentials, as they are closely linked to gender-equality values and to the
economic and non-economic costs of childbearing (Joshi 1998; McDonald 2000a;
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Hakim 2000; Hook 2010). We show that the strength of the association between
most policy indicators and completed fertility significantly differs depending on the
educational level of women in a theoretically interpretable manner, thus providing a
useful way of investigating contextual effects. These results provide some clues
regarding the changing individual-level correlation between education and fertility,
which has been reported in several countries. For example, in Sweden, highly
educated women now exhibit higher, or at least not lower, fertility than the less
educated (Andersson 2000), and the educational gap has also been reduced across
birth cohorts in Norway and the USA (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Shang and
Weinberg 2013).
We also consider the influence of gender norms for two reasons. First, the
dynamics of gender-equity norms may be associated with policy changes. Second,
the two may interact. For instance, Bonoli (2008) argues that gender-equality
policies cannot be expected to impact positively on fertility in a traditional society.
We therefore examine whether the statistical association between several policies
and fertility differs according to the degree of gender egalitarianism prevalent in the
society.
The relationship between selected indicators of policies and individual-level
fertility is examined using contextual data as well as data from the European Union
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for women between ages 36
and 44 during the years 2004–2009. Our empirical analyses focus on 16 Western
and Southern European countries showing a variety of fertility levels and policy
patterns. Lack of comparable contextual data precluded us from including several
Central and Eastern European countries in the analyses.
We apply multilevel regression models to explain completed fertility. Our focus
on completed fertility is due to its high political and scientific relevance (despite the
fact that it is seldom studied), but timing and parity differentials could not be
investigated in this paper due to space and data limitations. It should be taken into
account that data limitations prevent us from making strong causal statements, and
thus, we examine whether different policy and normative contexts are associated
with fertility outcomes at the individual level. As we discuss later in the paper, our
findings are highly consistent with theories relating gender relations and fertility
levels. Furthermore, our results suggest that, in the context of low fertility societies,
welfare state support to gender equality is a crucial factor for a recovery of fertility
levels.
2 Gender Equality and Fertility: The Role of Policies
Perhaps the most compelling and influential arguments linking gender relations to
fertility are those made by McDonald (2000a, b, 2006). He explains that the well-
known contrast in fertility levels between, on the one hand, Northwestern European
countries, the USA and Australia, where near-replacement levels are reached, and
on the other hand, the below-replacement levels predominant in Central, Eastern
and Southern Europe and Japan, is a result of the levels of gender equity that exist in
the different institutional spheres in each of these groups of countries. While the
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level of gender equity in access to education and the labor market (i.e., institutions
which deal with people as individuals) has reached relatively high levels in most
advanced countries, the levels in institutions which deal with people as members of
families, such as industrial relations (the terms and conditions of employment),
services, government transfers and taxation, and within the family itself, are highly
variable among these countries. In countries where the change toward more equality
in family-oriented institutions has been slow, the psychic and economic opportunity
costs of children increase, leaving women with stark choices between children and
employment. As the level of incoherence between social and economic institutions
and the dimension of gender equity increases, this leads to some women having
fewer children than they would like to have, and very low fertility. McDonald
highlights the importance of cultural values and idealized family morality in
slowing down changes in family-oriented institutions, arguing that gender equity in
both individual- and family-oriented institutions is necessary for fertility to rise—
otherwise the costs of fertility fall disproportionally on women.
2.1 Welfare Regimes Perspective
McDonald’s theory links fertility levels and patterns with the functioning of welfare
regime institutions. The welfare regime approach provides a suitable framework for
understanding relationships between institutions and is the central theoretical
framework for international comparative social-policy research (Esping-Andersen
1990, 1999; Mayer 2001). A welfare regime ‘‘can be defined as the combined,
interdependent way in which welfare is produced and allocated between state,
market, and family’’ (Esping-Andersen 1999, p. 35). The well-known classification
of social-democratic, liberal and conservative regimes rests on the relative weight of
each of these three institutions, which in turn is rooted on the longstanding cultural
ideas that are prevalent in each society. Thus, the principles of egalitarianism and
generous state-provided income protection and social services are typical of social-
democratic countries, while the ideas of individual responsibility and laissez-faire
state policy characterize liberal regimes. Conservative regimes boost the principles
of status segmentation and familism (i.e., the persistence of gender specialization in
household work).
Although this classification was initially devised to explain social class
stratification, it has also provided an adequate framework for analyzing gender
inequality. The gender and care dimensions have been progressively incorporated
into analyses of welfare regimes (Orloff 1993; Lewis 1992; Esping-Andersen 1999).
Several alternative classifications have been proposed, focusing on particular
dimensions such as care or working time, with different degrees of overlap with the
original ‘‘Three Worlds’’ typology (Bettio and Plantenga 2004; Hook 2010).
However, what is relevant for us here is the emphasis of the welfare regime
approach on the functioning of institutions, rather than particular typologies. For
instance, focusing on households directs analysis to the paid and unpaid work that
needs to be done by household members, its gender distribution and how policies
can affect them. This perspective also pays attention to the relative weight of each
institution, thus providing a proper context in which to understand the role of
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particular polices and its complementarities or contradictions with respect to other
policies and other institutions.
Each welfare regime type is associated with distinct patterns of social class, life
course and intergenerational risks, which are managed in different ways and with
different distributional consequences by the market, the state and households
(Esping-Andersen 1999). As highlighted by feminist literature on the welfare state,
gender-specific risks can also be added to this list. Systematic variations by regime
type can be found in the so-called mother penalty associated with childbirth, the
extent to which divorce or lone motherhood is associated with poverty, gender
differentials in unemployment and labor force participation, and the degree of
marginalization in relation to the social security system (Sigle-Rushton and
Waldfogel 2004). Furthermore, these patterns are related to women’s capability to
form independent households and to make genuine choices about care and
childbearing (Orloff 1993; Neyer et al. 2013). State policies are particularly
important in understanding these patterns, since they have a critical role in
structuring and shaping institutions. Here we highlight two dimensions of these
policies that are particularly relevant for gender equality and its relationship with
childbearing: care policies and labor market policies.
2.2 Care Policies
Two policy strategies have been adopted to ‘‘defamilialize’’ childcare work.1 The
first is based on the state provision of early childhood education and care services.
The second is based instead on creating the conditions for market provision, through
labor market and childcare regulations, often supplemented by subsidies and tax
deductions. There are different policy mixes in European countries, which lead to
different coverage rates and different outcomes in terms of equality of access and
the degree of heterogeneity in the quality of care (Bettio and Plantenga 2004;
Plantenga et al. 2008). Of course, family care has remained substantial and, to the
extent that women are still the main providers of it, a strong reliance on household
care constrains their labor market participation. Furthermore, family care activities
have a crucial role in child development (Waldfogel et al. 2002) and are likely to be
a central motivator for fertility behavior. Thus, it is relevant to consider how
policies support (or hinder) care activities at home as well as the way they shape
labor market participation.
2.3 Labor Market Policies
Though gender discrimination in the labor market has been reduced since the 1960s,
a substantial degree of vertical and horizontal segregation persists. Labor market
reforms have often pursued the labor market ‘‘activation’’ of women (Lewis 2002;
Cipollone et al. 2013). At the same time, there is a huge variety among European
countries in the extent to which labor market organization takes into account that
1 Defamilializaton is defined as the extent to which household tasks and care work done by families is
reduced by being provided from outside the household.
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individuals have family responsibilities. In this respect, working-time arrangements
set by national regulations and collective agreements are of particular importance,
since they both establish how much time is available for caregiving and constrain
parents’ ability to share care among them. Long standard work weeks have been
shown to lead to a reduced involvement of fathers in childcare and housework
(Hook 2010; Baizan et al. 2014) and are related to low proportions of women in full-
time jobs (Rubery et al. 1998; Williams 2000). Part-time work has been promoted
by several governments as a response to the work/family conflict; however, it
remains almost exclusively a female response that does not question the women’s
primary responsibility for childcare, while involving significant income differentials
by gender.
Labor market policies also include more explicit regulations supporting the
familialization of care with time and transfers. There is a wide variety in leave
provisions in Europe, with different consequences for gender equality in the labor
market and care work (Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2004; Rubery et al. 1998;
Hook 2010). These provisions imply a ‘‘modernization’’ of the care arrangement, in
the sense that they make full- or part-time dedication to childcare a temporary stage
in women’s labor market trajectories (Pfau-Effinger 2005), significantly reducing
the costs of childrearing. However, leave provisions are highly gendered, and
fathers’ take-up of leave time has remained marginal, except in the Nordic countries
(Duvander et al. 2010). Women’s decisions to enter or stay in the labor market are
further shaped by policies regarding benefits and taxes in connection to children,
which may provide incentives or disincentives for participation (Del Boca et al.
2009; Cipollone et al. 2013).
The abovementioned policy arrangements reflect the combined effects of many
different and often contradictory forces. According to Korpi (2000a, b), welfare
policies are the outcome of political struggle. In Western Europe, the main actors
involved in that struggle have been political parties, unions, churches and women’s
movements. This author highlights the role of confessional parties in supporting
family care and maintaining gender differentials, as opposed to social-democratic
and liberal parties. Policy inertia and entrenched interests may lead to contradicting
layers of policy arrangements.
2.4 The Impact of Norms
It is necessary to bear in mind that institutions are always embedded in broader
social contexts that include citizens’ attitudes, norms and values, which may support
or counteract policy outcomes. In a recent work, Esping-Andersen and Billari
(2015) linked the evolution of gender-equality norms with fertility developments.
The authors depict the gender-equality ‘‘revolution’’ as a process of diffusion of new
norms, in which a relatively high-fertility/low-gender-equality equilibrium is broken
by a transition toward a more egalitarian society, which in its first steps brings about
a decline in fertility rates. Then, a recovery of fertility is expected, when the gender-
equity revolution is completed. Arpino et al. (2015) provide empirical evidence in
favor of a U-shaped relationship between changes over time in gender-equitable at-
titudes and fertility at the country level. Key discontinuities that trigger the start of
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changes in the long-term trends are brought about by increases in the education of
women, improving household technologies and modern contraception.2 Some
institutional characteristics of societies (such as trust or stratification) may speed up
or hinder that process.
Though the evolution of gender norms in a given society can be theorized along a
continuum, it remains a challenge to explain the strong diversity that exists among
European countries. In this respect, Pfau-Effinger proposes a classification with five
cultural models about the family and the way it is related with gender and care: the
housewife model of the male breadwinner family; the family economy model;3 the
male breadwinner/female part-time carer model; the dual-breadwinner/external carer
model; and the dual-breadwinner/dual-carer model (Pfau-Effinger 2004; Crompton
1999). The prevalence of each of these models is highly variable across European
countries, and it can be assumed that they are closely related to the particular policies
that support them. Nevertheless, though they may not exactly parallel state welfare
policy packages, gender ideologies tend to be related to them (Gornick and Meyers
2003). The evolution of gender norms seems to be closely related to variations in the
institutional context of support for working parents (Anxo et al. 2007): For example,
countries with greater childcare coverage tend to have higher maternal labor force
participation rates and less rigid gender roles. We must also highlight the role of
institutional arrangements and policies not only in creating opportunity structures for
making family formation decisions, but also in influencing family values in a dynamic
way (Bowles 1998; Jakee and Sun 2001). Moreover, social interaction can lead to a
multiplier effect of policies (Fent et al. 2013). Thus, family policies, gender norms
and labor market conditions are interrelated, and this must be taken into account when
studying the relationship between policies and fertility.
The variety of family and gender arrangements in European countries underlines
that institutional change does not follow one single path. It also suggests the
existence of ‘‘unstable equilibriums’’ (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015), in which
the existence of policies supporting a particular model may tip the balance toward it,
thus promoting the prevalence of that model in the population. At the same time,
although there are several examples of changes in particular policies, the overall
policy frameworks tend to be highly stable. Many studies emphasize the long-
standing differences in social institutions and their typically slow and path-
dependent evolution (McNicoll 1994; Mayer 2001).
2.5 The Gender Transition
Since the 1970s, advanced societies have been moving away from the assumption of
the breadwinner–homemaker family in favor of more gender equality. Cross-
2 Other factors include the increase in demand for female labor, typical of postindustrial and knowledge
economies, the commodification of goods and services outside the household, and the historical reduction
in fertility that frees women’s time for other activities. Nevertheless, none of these factors can be
considered as completely exogenous.
3 This model ‘‘was and is mainly spread in agrarian and craft families in which care was not well
developed as a specific task, allocated to specific persons and needing specific skills’’, Pfau-Effinger
(2005, p 329).
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national variations are substantial, but it is possible to summarize overall policy
trends in four ‘‘ideal–typical’’ stages starting from the situation in the 1960s, when
all countries were dominated by policies supporting the male breadwinner model. In
the first stage of the gender transition, women enter the labor market, but there is no
institutional adaptation to women’s participation. This often leads to a ‘‘double-
shift’’ scenario with declining fertility.
In the second stage, there is some institutional adaptation to women’s new roles.
Barriers to women’s labor market participation are gradually removed, so that they
can reap the benefits from it. Policies may include the promotion of part-time jobs,
the introduction of (paid) parental leaves and the expansion of formal childcare
provision. The goal has often been to accommodate or promote women’s
employment, resulting in the creation of an adult worker model for both genders
(Orloff 2002). As time-use analyses have shown, at this stage, men’s roles have only
marginally changed (Kan et al. 2011), precluding gender equality in both the labor
market and the home. These changes amount to a modification of the traditional
male model of work and welfare and its generalization to women (Lewis 2002).
In the third stage, institutional adaptation begins to focus more on men’s roles.
Men take an increasing responsibility for care and domestic work, and their labor
market involvement starts to change, for instance, by increasing their use of
paternity leave. Policies supporting these changes include the promotion of fathers’
leaves and adapting the work environment to the growing caring role of men—such
as shorter working hours or more flexible time schedules. Even if gender-equality
values are highly prevalent, it is not yet clear what economic or social incentives
men may have to adopt what have traditionally been women’s roles (Gonza´lez et al.
2009).
The fourth stage involves a fully egalitarian model, in which both men and
women are workers and carers to a similar extent (the ‘‘dual-earner/dual-caregiver’’
society). No society has reached this stage yet. Increasing rates of female
employment have narrowed the gender gap in labor force participation, but gender
differences persist in such areas as career breaks, occupational segregation, working
hours or pay. And although men’s engagement in domestic work and caregiving has
increased in many countries, nowhere does it match women’s influx into paid
employment. In reality, the stages overlap, and the timing of changes is likely to be
particularly important for fertility outcomes. If change comes late but very rapidly,
as in Southern Europe, this might provoke very low fertility. If institutions begin to
adapt early, as in Scandinavia, then a higher fertility level is easier to sustain.
3 The Differential Impact of Gender Policy Models: Hypotheses
In the theoretical framework sketched above, gender-equality polices have the role
of providing concrete resources and opportunities to women and families as well as
the role of influencing norms in a society. These policies mitigate the gendered costs
of childbearing by supporting particular models of families and gender relations.
Thus, the institutional context, including policies, helps to determine the structure of
costs and rewards of fertility. To the extent that particular policies reduce the direct
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and especially the indirect economic costs of childbearing, they can have a positive
effect on fertility (Hotz et al. 1997; DiPrete et al. 2003). Non-economic costs
associated with cultural norms and individuals’ values are also likely to be relevant
for fertility. The reduction in women’s labor force participation linked to having
children involves costs such as detachment from the paid labor force, the loss of
social networks, the loss of skills, the loss of social status, the loss of self-esteem
and especially the loss of gender equality in the couple (Joshi 1998; McDonald
2000a). Again, gender policies can reduce these costs, leading to an increase in
fertility. Therefore, in the context of countries with high levels of women’s
education and where a large fraction of women has joined the labor force (i.e., all
the countries considered in this study), it can be hypothesized that public policies
that support egalitarian gender relations have an overall positive effect on fertility
(Hypothesis 1). Conversely, policies centered on the male breadwinner model are
likely to be counter productive for rising fertility levels. In order to empirically
examine this hypothesis, we use several indicators of policies that are expected to
reflect key dimensions of the effect of the gender system on fertility (see the section
on data for details on the indicators used in the analyses). In particular, we focus on
‘‘work-family reconciliation’’ polices, for both men and women, in the areas of
working-time regulations and childcare (including policies that provide time or
money to care). Of course, we acknowledge that many other polices have a potential
impact on fertility or on gender relations. For instance, health and education
subsidies decrease the cost of children for parents, and elderly care policies may
influence women’s involvement in paid work, etc. Nevertheless, here we focus on
polices that directly influence the gender division of labor for parents, which is
considered a critical element by the theoretical arguments cited above.
Though policy factors provide a common context for all individuals, they may
not affect all of them in the same way. Societies provide particular structures of
incentives and costs of having children that apply to some individuals (or couples)
more than others. In particular, the decline in women’s status that is often observed
upon the birth of a child is closely related to her employment situation and
educational level. The economic and psychic costs of having children tend to be
particularly high for highly educated women if the combination of parenthood and
paid work is difficult. As a consequence, fertility drops are generally severe for them
in the early stages of the gender transition, while educational differentials tend to
disappear, or even reverse, in more advanced stages. Opportunity costs, i.e., the loss
of income related to time out of the labor force to care for children, have been
rightly highlighted in the literature, while the direct economic costs seem to be
relatively less important for women with high market productivity (Hotz et al.
1997). Yet, as the educational level of women increases, the non-economic costs of
a reduction in labor force participation associated with having children are likely to
become more important. Education is also associated with a higher prevalence of
gender-egalitarian values for both women and men, such that these costs are likely
to be more relevant for highly educated individuals. It is, for example, widely
documented that higher-educated couples are far more disposed toward gender
egalitarianism (Coltrane 2000). Less-educated women not only face lower
opportunity costs of interrupting careers but are also more likely to find themselves
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in precarious labor market situations, making conventional gender roles appear
more attractive. Role specialization is also likely to be further reinforced by unequal
bargaining positions and by social approval expectations, especially among family
members. Finally, it should be taken into account that education is associated with
higher incomes and employment security. A positive ‘‘income effect’’ on fertility
can be expected from this association, premised on the existence of policies
favoring the compatibility between care and paid work.
Overall, we would expect that welfare states with a strong gender-egalitarian
profile should help narrow the fertility gap between higher- and lower-educated
women. Thus, our second hypothesis is that the higher the level of gender equality
prevalent in the welfare regime institutions is, the lower the negative association
between women’s level of education and fertility will be (Hypothesis 2). This logic
is applied to specific contextual factors or policies, to the extent that they give
support to a particular gender arrangement. For example, childcare services favor
the combination of work and parenthood and therefore should have a generally
positive effect on fertility, following our first hypothesis. Additionally, we
hypothesize that the availability of formal childcare should have a stronger positive
effect on the fertility of highly educated women relative to the low-educated
women. Improved access to childcare means that wage-dependant opportunity costs
are substituted by childcare costs, which are generally less dependent on income
(Ermisch 1989). Since better-educated women have a higher involvement in paid
work and higher wages, they will benefit more from the reduction in opportunity
costs resulting from an increased availability of formal childcare.
As suggested above, a high number of standard working hours for men can be
considered a barrier to their involvement in childcare and unpaid work, while labor
market policies that enable fathers to reallocate time for caregiving support dual-
earner–caregiver families. We therefore expect that this indicator negatively affects
fertility, especially for highly educated mothers, since it reinforces gender role
specialization.
The availability of part-time work facilitates the combination of paid and unpaid
work. Thus, a generally positive effect on fertility can be expected. In the early
stages of the gender transition, a large fraction of women may seek this
arrangement, except among lower-educated women, which may tend to prefer a
full-time housewife role. However, women’s part-time work also favors a gender
specialization model in which women are secondary earners and main caregivers,
which may not be attractive to highly educated women. Furthermore, part-time
work characteristics differ considerably between countries. In Southern Europe, it is
often associated with precarious working conditions, while in the Nordic countries
and the Netherlands, it is more compatible with career jobs, potentially enhancing
the ability of more educated women to reach their fertility goals. These
contradicting influences may weaken the expected positive effect of this variable.
In principle, the existence of paid parental leave for women can enhance the
compatibility of paid and unpaid work, potentially having a pro-natalist effect. In
fact, in all countries studied, there is a minimum paid leave period with a guaranteed
return to the job. However, the effect of this variable on fertility may not be clear-
cut, since very long leaves (i.e., more than a year) tend to negatively affect labor
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force attachment. Additionally, short leaves have been associated with poorer health
and developmental outcomes for children (Waldfogel et al. 2002). Furthermore,
leave policies focused on women reinforce their caregiver role, while decreasing the
caregiver role of men. Unfortunately, a measure of father’s leave use is not available
for all the countries studied, but it would be a powerful indicator of an evolution
toward a gender-equal arrangement. Well-paid leaves should have a positive effect
on fertility, especially for highly educated women. In fact, based on economic
theory, a higher pay rate (e.g., 100 % instead of 80 % of the salary) would imply a
reduction in the opportunity cost of childbearing and thus may be expected to have a
positive effect on fertility (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997).
Child benefits and tax deductions may only be aimed at reducing the direct cost
of children and can be designed in a way that does not create disincentives for
women’s labor force participation (Gustafsson and Stafford 1994). However, they
often reflect the logic of the conventional male breadwinner model (Orloff 2002).
On the whole, these kinds of policies can be hypothesized to have a higher positive
impact on the fertility levels of low-educated women, because financial incentives
are likely to represent a higher proportion of the cost of children for low-income
couples.
If the effects of policies can vary according to the prevailing gender norms
existing in different countries, this suggests the convenience of including a measure
of them in the analyses. Furthermore, as outlined above, the effects of gender norms
and policies influence each other, reinforcing their effects over time. Therefore, we
expect that the effect of policies favoring the combination of work and parenthood
will be stronger the more gender-equal a society is (Hypothesis 3), i.e., in statistical
terms, we expect a positive interaction between policies and macro-level gender
equality. By the same token, policy measures that conflict with a gender-equality
model or favor gender role specialization, such as short-paid parental leaves, certain
types of family benefits, or even part-time work, could be negatively associated with
fertility levels when combined with a high proportion of adherence to gender-
egalitarian norms in the population.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use the EU-SILC longitudinal data for the years 2004–2009 for 16 Western and
Southern European countries for which we also have contextual information. We
restrict our analyses to the most recent observation of women aged 36–44 years,
yielding a working sample of 69,213 women (the number of women per country
ranges from 2326 to 13,871). The dependent variable used in all the analyses is the
total number of own children living in the same household as the mother at the time
of interview. This variable approximates the completed fertility of women. In
Table 1, we compare the average number of children per women as estimated with
EU-SILC data with data on completed fertility from the Human Fertility Database
(HFD 2014). Women in our sample were born between 1960 and 1973, but
completed fertility data from HFD are available for the cohorts born between 1935
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and 1968. Moreover, data are not available for all countries in our dataset. However,
for ten countries, we can compare data for the cohort born around 1966 which
corresponds to approximately the central year in which women in our sample were
born. Table 1 shows that, usually, estimates from EU-SILC are very close to
completed fertility data from HFD. Nonetheless, our goal is not to describe
completed fertility at the country level but to estimate associations between number
of children at the individual level and individual- and country-level independent
variables.
The explanatory variables include, firstly, the respondent’s age at the time of the
survey and the highest educational level attained. We have coded education into
three categories: some secondary education and less, completed secondary and/or
post-secondary non-tertiary education (the reference category that includes the
range from upper secondary studies to post-secondary education that cannot be
regarded as university-level studies) and university studies or higher.
We complement the micro-level data with country-level data on policies, labor
market conditions and norms. In particular, we consider data on family benefits,
leaves, availability of formal childcare, labor market conditions and the prevalence
of gender-equitable attitudes (as an indicator of norms). We use contextual
information reflecting the situation in the mid-1990s (1992–1998), when most of the
Table 1 Completed fertility by country: EU-SILC estimates compared to HFD data
Country EU-SILC EU-SILC EU-SILC HFD
All years 1964–1968 1966 1966
Austria 1.63 1.64 1.60 1.64
Belgium 1.71 1.78 1.90 …
Denmark 1.88 1.90 1.85 …
Finland 1.95 1.95 1.94 1.92
France 1.73 1.70 1.68 2.02
Germany 1.58 1.62 1.59 1.52
Greece 1.64 1.67 1.75 …
Ireland 2.03 2.06 2.22 …
Italy 1.38 1.38 1.42 …
Luxembourg 1.71 1.67 1.58 …
Netherlands 1.80 1.82 1.82 1.78
Norway 2.04 2.09 2.12 2.07
Portugal 1.66 1.66 1.61 1.82
Spain 1.53 1.54 1.58 …
Sweden 2.02 2.06 2.08 2.00
UK 1.67 1.70 1.74 1.90
Our working sample from EU-SILC data includes women born between 1960 and 1973. About 50 % of
the sample was born in the years 1964–1968. For some countries, the Human Fertility Database (HFD
2014) provides data on completed fertility for cohorts born between 1935 and 1968. We report data for
the 1966 cohort or if not available (Finland, Netherlands, Norway) for the 1965
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women in our sample had their children. When data are not available for this period,
we consider the oldest data available. In any case, variations in country-specific
indicators over time are very limited. The values of our macro-level indicators are
reported in Table 2.
Regarding family benefits, we include the following indicator:
• Monthly family allowances in US dollars (PPP adjusted) for the second child
(family allowances), years 1992–1998. Values are divided by 1000 when using
the variable in the regression models.
We also tested for allowances for the first and third child, but results were very
similar to those reported. We also considered another indicator for tax and benefit
transfers. For the sake of brevity, we do not present the regression results using this
indicator, as these were similar to those reported here for monthly family allowance.
Measuring leave benefits is a hard task. There are important cross-country
variations regarding overall length, level of compensation and eligibility criteria of
maternity and parental leave (Ray et al. 2010; Wall 2007). Saraceno and Keck
(2009) note that some countries (e.g., France) offer both very long and well-
compensated parental leave. Other countries, like Spain, offer quite long leaves but
pay only a short period of them, while still others, such as Greece, offer a leave that
is comparatively short. Moreover, while almost all developed countries include a
period of maternity leave, some countries also offer parental and/or childcare leaves,
i.e., optional leave periods available after the period covered by the maternity leave
scheme and usually not restricted to mothers. Similar to Gornick and Meyers
(2003), our indicator takes into account these three types of leave, their duration and
level of compensation. Specifically, we use the following indicator:
• Sum of weeks of maternity, paternity and childcare leave weighted by the level
of cash benefits paid during each type of leave (measured by the percent of
female wages in manufacturing, Gauthier 2011). The resulting indicator can be
interpreted as the total equivalent number of leave weeks paid at 100 %
(considering average female salaries) (weighted leave weeks), years 1992–1998.
Data on family benefits and leaves are taken from the Comparative Family Policy
Database (see Gauthier 2011 for details on the indicators and sources of data).
To measure the availability of formal childcare, we use the childcare coverage
measure contained in the Multilinks database (Saraceno and Keck 2009) and defined
as:
• Number of places in public (or publicly subsidized) childcare facilities as a share
of the number of children aged 0–2 years (childcare coverage), year 2004.
When analyzing the effect of policies, childcare coverage is a more meaningful
indicator to use than indicators of the usage of childcare services (for a discussion
see Saraceno and Keck 2009). However, as data on usage are frequently employed,
we also considered the following indicator:
14 P. Baizan et al.
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• Children aged 0–2 years cared for in formal childcare arrangements as a
percentage of all children in the same age group (childcare usage), year 2004.
Data on childcare usage are also reported in the Multilinks database. These data,
made available by Eurostat, are obtained by the aggregation of micro-level data
from EU-SILC. As can be seen in Table 2, coverage and usage for some countries
differ quite substantially. According to Saraceno and Keck (2009), this is mainly
due to the fact that coverage only refers to public or publicly subsidized services,
while EU-SILC data on usage also include private formal childcare.
To capture labor market conditions, we include two indicators from OECD data
(2014):
• Standard number of working hours per week for men (men working hours),
years 1992–1998.
• Share of women working part-time out of the total number of employed women
(women on part-time), years 1992–1998. Part-time is defined as less than
30-week-usual hours worked in the main job.
Finally, in order to measure the spread of gender-egalitarian norms, we use data
from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS). We
include data from the oldest wave for which our indicator is available (1999). Our
measure of gender-egalitarian norms is based on a widely used item in gender
studies (e.g., Arpino and Tavares 2013; Arpino et al. 2015; Seguino 2007): ‘‘When
jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.’’ The
questionnaire offers three possible answers: (1) ‘‘agree,’’ (2) ‘‘disagree’’ and (3)
‘‘neither.’’ We recode the variable into a binary response: 0 is ‘‘agree’’ or ‘‘neither’’
and 1 is ‘‘disagree’’ and calculate the percentage at the country level.
We decided to use only one question instead of an index summarizing more than
one item because the chosen indicator clearly measures views toward gender roles
in the labor market, making it the most relevant to an analysis such as ours, which
focuses on the contextual factors facilitating the reconciliation of motherhood and a
career. As argued by Arpino et al. (2015), this item has both a high theoretical and
empirical validity. Among all the items available in the WVS–EVS data, the one we
use shows the highest adherence to the concept of gender equity because it is the
only question that clearly puts men and women into juxtaposition in terms of the
adequacy of their respective gender roles. For these reasons, it is the item that more
closely resembles the ones proposed by McDonald (2000b) to measures the share of
people who agree with gender-equity values in a given country. However, it is
important to keep in mind that it focuses only on the labor market dimension of
gender roles. For the sake of simplicity, from this point on, we will refer to this
measure as the gender-equality indicator.
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5 Methods
Since our dependent variable is a count variable (number of children), we employ
Poisson’s regression models to estimate the association between individual and
contextual independent variables and fertility.4 In order to take into account that our
dataset has a hierarchical structure with women clustered in countries, we use
multilevel (random effects) Poisson’s regression models to adjust for intra-country
correlation (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004).
In a multilevel Poisson’s regression model, we basically model the probability
that the outcome variable takes a given value (count) as a function of a set of
covariates and random effects:
Pðyij ¼ yÞ ¼ exp½ðxijbþ ujÞðxijbþ ujÞy=y! ð1Þ
where the subscript ij indicates a woman belonging to country j, yij denotes the
responses (number of children for woman ij; y = 0, 1, 2,…), xij represents the
independent variables with (fixed) coefficients b and uj represents country-level
random effects (‘‘random intercepts’’). For each country, uj is a realization from a
normal variable with mean 0 and standard deviation to be estimated. Independent
variables can be included at the both individual and country level. Multilevel
models can handle unbalanced data structures characterized by different cluster
sizes (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004), as in our dataset where sample sizes
across countries vary. In this case, each cluster automatically contributes to the log
likelihood with a weight proportional to its size.
One limitation for the application of a multilevel model in our case is the limited
number of countries available in our dataset (16). In fact, multilevel modeling
requires a sufficient sample size at each level of the hierarchy. Simulation studies, as
summarized in the literature review by McNeish and Stapleton (2014), have shown
that with a limited number of clusters (i.e., countries in our case), estimation of
variance components (i.e., the variance of random errors at the different levels) is
particularly problematic. However, our focus is on the point estimate of ‘‘fixed
effects’’ (beta coefficients) to interpret the association between number of children
and individual- and country-level predictors. Simulation studies have found that in
this case, the use of multilevel models with a small number of clusters, even as few
as ten, is less problematic (e.g., Paccagnella 2011).5 Moreover, within each country,
we have large samples (i.e., the cluster sizes are high) and this is important for
avoiding biased point estimates (Austin 2010). In any case, caution is needed in the
interpretation of our analyses because the small number of clusters can affect the
estimation of standard errors.
All models have been estimated using the command meqrpoisson in Stata13. In
all models considered, we controlled for age and education. Education was entered
as an individual-level covariate. To take into account that the amount of exposure
4 We use the Vuong test to check for the presence of zero inflation. Since the test was rejected for each
considered model specification, we employed the Poisson model.
5 We have to notice that the available methodological papers focussed on linear and logistic models and
that there are no simulation studies specific for multilevel Poisson models.
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time over which the dependent variable is observed for each women in the sample
varies (our sample include women aged 36–44 years), we included the variable age
in the exposure option. In this way, the estimates are adjusted for the length of time
a woman was at risk of having children even though the coefficient of the variable
age is not estimated and therefore will not be reported in the tables [log(age) is
included in the fixed-effects portion of the model with the coefficient constrained to
be 1]. Using age as a covariate yielded results similar to those presented here.
To test our hypotheses, the country-level indicators described in the previous
section are also considered as independent variables together with individual
controls. A key advantage of using multilevel models in our analysis is that they
recognize that the relevant sample size at the country level for estimating
coefficients of the country-level variables is the number of countries in the dataset
and not the overall sample size. However, having a low number of countries implies
that we have limited degrees of freedom at the country level, limiting the number of
country-level variables we can simultaneously enter into the model. Moreover, our
country-level variables show a quite high degree of correlation (see Table 6).
Therefore, to avoid problems of multicollinearity, and as is typically done in cross-
national multilevel studies characterized by a low number of countries (see e.g.,
Aassve et al. 2013), we entered our country-level variables one by one.
Some of our hypotheses involve an interaction between women’s education and
macro-level indicators or an interaction between macro-level indicators. To ease
interpretation of results, model estimates reported in the tables are complemented by
graphs reporting the predicted number of children for different levels and
combinations of independent variables. We also report 95 % confidence intervals
for pair-wise comparisons. These intervals are centered on the predictions and have
lengths equal to 2 9 1.39 9 standard errors. As showed by Goldstein and Healy
(1995), this is necessary in order to have an average level of 5 % for the Type I error
probability in pair-wise comparisons of a group of means. Therefore, in the figures,
an overlap in terms of the confidence intervals indicates that predictions are not
significantly different, whereas non-overlap reflects that they are.
6 Results
We start by presenting the estimates from a series of two-level Poisson’s regression
models in Table 3. Model 1 only includes educational levels as an independent
variable, while Models 2–7 also add our country-level variables one at time. As
explained in the previous section, all models control for age effects. We can see that
the estimated variance of the country-level random effect (last row of Tables 3, 4, 5)
is always statistically significant, meaning that there is substantial variation across
countries in the average number of children and that a multilevel model is needed.
Estimates of Model 1 in Table 3 show that women’s education has a negative and
statistically significant relationship with completed fertility. Given the complexity
of the Poisson model, to better interpret estimated coefficients, we display the
predicted number of children by women’s education level in Fig. 1. This graph
shows that the association of education with fertility is substantial, implying that the
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predicted average number of children for women with lower secondary education or
less is about 1.89, for a women with upper secondary education it is 1.71 and for the
highly educated it is 1.65. This result is consistent with what is known about cohort
educational differentials in completed fertility for the countries we consider (Basten
et al. 2013). As noted above, in a few countries (e.g., the Nordic countries), this
negative relationship has substantially weakened for recent birth cohorts, as is
consistent with a relatively advanced stage in the gender transition.
Results of Models 2–7 provide evidence on the relationship of our country-level
indicators with completed fertility. The goal of this analysis is to empirically
explore the overall association between fertility and specific policies supporting
different gender relations models (Hypothesis 1). In Table 4, we show the
interaction of education with each of the contextual variables considered, as a way
of testing whether gender-equality policies have a stronger positive association with
the fertility of women with a higher level of education (Hypothesis 2).
Starting with formal childcare coverage for children under 3, an overall
significant positive association with fertility is found (Model 4 in Table 3 shows a
coefficient of 0.004, with p\ 0.01), which is consistent with Hypothesis 1 for this
variable. Moreover, we found a significant interaction between childcare coverage
and education levels in the direction predicted by Hypothesis 2. In fact, Model 3 in
Table 4 shows that childcare coverage and fertility are positively related for all
educational groups, but this relationship is stronger for the highly educated (0.002;
p\ 0.001) and weaker for the lower-educated (-0.001; p\ 0.1), as compared with
women with a medium level of education.6 Again, to ease interpretations, the third
graph in Fig. 2 plots the predicted number of children by educational level and
childcare coverage (ranged approximately over the range of observed values). From
Fig. 2, we can see that childcare coverage is positively related to fertility for all
educational groups, but this association is especially substantial for highly educated
women. Increasing the coverage rate from 10 % (corresponding to the observed
value for Italy in 1992–1998) to 50 % (Sweden), the average number of children of
low-educated women is predicted to increase from 1.8 to 2.0. For highly educated
women, an equivalent increase in coverage rates leads to a jump from 1.5 to 1.9 in
the predicted number of children. Interestingly, the interaction effect between
education and childcare coverage makes the education gradient in fertility
disappear: Significant education differences can be observed only for medium–
low levels of childcare coverage.
This strong association of formal childcare with completed fertility is consistent
with our expectations. By allowing a de-familialization of childcare work, childcare
services facilitate both the labor market participation of women and a more gender-
equal sharing of care. The strength of these results is remarkable when we consider
national differences in formal childcare systems with respect to opening times,
which imply that full compatibility with paid work is often not possible.
Furthermore, high rates of childcare are consistent with a dual-earner model, but
do not necessarily involve a gender-equal share of care work.
6 Models using childcare usage instead of coverage yield very similar results. Results are available upon
request.
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The relationship between standard men’s working hours and fertility shows the
expected pattern. Long hours are negatively associated with the number of children,
though not significantly (Table 3, Model 5). However, Model 4 in Table 4 shows a
significant interaction between this variable and education. While increasing the
number of men’s working hours from 38 (about the value observed for Denmark) to
45 (Greece) is associated with a small decrease in fertility for the low educated, it
substantially reduces the fertility of the highly educated from 1.8 to less than 1.5
(fourth graph in Fig. 2). Long workweeks epitomize the male breadwinner model,
which clearly conflicts with fertility, with the exception of the low educated.
Conversely, the results suggest that policies aiming to increase fertility should take
men’s time available for childcare into account.
Regarding our second indicator of working-time arrangements, the percentage of
women in part-time work, our results are less clear-cut. The degree to which women
have access to part-time jobs does not appear to be associated with fertility in
general. But, once again, the relationship differs between education levels: The
behavior of the low educated significantly differs from that of the middle and highly
educated, such that part-time work is negligibly associated with fertility for the low
educated. For the middle and the highly educated, an increase from 12 to 50 % in
the proportion of women in part-time work is associated with a change from about
1.6 to 1.8 children per women (fifth graph in Fig. 2). However, this change is not
statistically significant.
Fig. 1 Predicted number of children (y-axis) by woman’s educational level (x-axis) with 95 %
confidence level intervals for pair-wise comparisons. Note: Predictions are obtained using estimates from
a multilevel Poisson’s regression model (Model 1, Table 3). Confidence intervals are centered on the
predictions and have lengths equals to 2 9 1.39 9 standard errors to have an average level of 5 % for the
Type I error probability in the pair-wise comparisons of a group of means (Goldstein and Healy 1995)
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Fig. 2 Predicted number of children (y-axis) by country-level variables (x-axis) and woman’s
educational level with 95 % confidence level intervals for pair-wise comparisons. Note: Predictions are
obtained using estimates from multilevel Poisson’s regression models (Models 1–6, Table 4). Values of
country-level variables are ranged over the observed ranged of values. Confidence intervals are centered
on the predictions and have lengths equals to 2 9 1.39 9 standard errors to have an average level of 5 %
for the Type I error probability in the pair-wise comparisons of a group of means (Goldstein and Healy
1995)
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The relationship of our indicator of paid parental leave with fertility shows
similar results: a positive nonsignificant overall association (Model 3, Table 3), but
a significant interaction for the low educated (Model 2, Table 4). An increase in the
weighted number of paid weeks of leave from 10 to 75 is associated with an
increase from 1.83 to 1.92 for the low educated and to an increase from 1.56 to 1.80
for the highly educated (as in the second graph in Fig. 2).
We have considered several measures of cash transfers to families with children,
including family allowances for the first, second or third child, and tax and benefit
Table 4 Estimates of a series of two-level Poisson’s regression models for completed fertility as
function of women’s education, macro-variables and their interaction
Variables Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educational level
Low 0.120*** 0.126*** 0.120*** -0.594*** 0.167*** 0.413***
Medium (Ref.)

























Constant -3.201*** -3.224*** -3.259*** -2.331*** -3.254*** -3.879***
Var(country) -2.172*** -2.211*** -2.339*** -2.235*** -2.178*** -2.525***
In each model, we include education levels (medium is the reference), one of the macro-variable at time
and its interaction with education (in italic). Var(country) indicates the variance of the random effect at
the second level (country)
? p\ 0.10; * p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01; *** p\ 0.001
22 P. Baizan et al.
123
transfers for the second child. All of these indicators show a similar pattern: The
overall association with fertility as well as interactions for the low and middle
educated is not significant (Model 2, Table 3), while the association between these
indicators and fertility for highly educated women is strongly positive (Model 1,
Table 4 and first graph in Fig. 2). In principle, cash transfers should lead to an
‘‘income’’ effect, stimulating fertility. However, this last effect seems to be offset by
a negative effect on women’s labor force participation, at least for the low and
middle educated. The results suggest that this last situation would not hold for the
highly educated, who most likely have a strong labor force attachment.
And what is the relationship between the prevalence of gender-egalitarian norms
in the population and completed fertility? Here, our main hypothesis finds some
support: The more gender-egalitarian attitudes are diffused in a country, the higher
the fertility (Table 3, Model 7). Once more, the strength of the association differs
sharply by education (Table 4, Model 6). Gender-egalitarian attitudes are positively
related to fertility for all educational groups, but the strength of the association is
stronger for women with higher education, who have the lowest probability of
Table 5 Estimates of a series of two-level Poisson’s regression models for completed fertility as
function of women’s education, macro-variables and interaction between gender-equality norms and
policy variables
Variables Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Educational level
Low 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.095***
Medium (ref.)
High -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041***
Gender-equality norms 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.008** 0.009***
Family allowances 0.755
9Gender equality 0.077




Men working hours 0.001
9Gender equality -0.001
Women part-time work 0.004
9Gender equality -0.000
Constant -3.177*** -3.177*** -3.169*** -3.183*** -3.179***
Var(country) -2.610*** -2.566*** -2.592*** -2.544*** -2.611***
In each model, we include education levels (medium is the reference), gender-equality norms, one of the
macro-variable at time and its interaction with gender-equality norms (in italic). All macro-level variables
are mean centered. Var(country) indicates the variance of the random effect at the second level (country)
? p\ 0.10; * p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01; *** p\ 0.001
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adhering to a traditional family model, and thus have the highest probability to gain
from living in a country where gender-egalitarian attitudes are widely accepted.
When the prevalence of our gender-egalitarian attitudes is 65 %, the mean predicted
completed fertility is 1.4 for highly educated women and 1.75 for low-educated
women. An increase in gender-equality attitudes to 95 % is associated with a
convergence in fertility levels across educational groups, reaching around 2.0
children per women (sixth graph in Fig. 2).
Finally, we expected that the strength of the relationship between fertility and
policies favoring the combination of work and parenthood would be stronger the
more gender-equal a society is, and vice versa for policies not directed at favoring
gender equality (Hypothesis 3). Overall, the results provide no evidence that gender
policies are more effective if egalitarian norms are highly prevalent in the
population (Table 5). This may be because in all countries egalitarian values are
highly prevalent, reaching well over 50 %, suggesting that gender policies should be
effective everywhere. This may also be due to the reduced number of degrees of
freedom at the country level. The results also suggest that egalitarian values are
independent from specific policies in enhancing fertility levels.
7 Conclusions
Using data from the EU-SILC database for sixteen European countries, we have
analyzed the relationship between gender policies and individual-level completed
fertility. Our results provide evidence in two areas: First, policies that support
particular gender relations models are associated with fertility and, second, these
associations are strongly heterogeneous in the population by the level of education.
Framing the analyses in the welfare regime perspective has been useful in
identifying key policies that shape gender relations and understand their relative role
in the institutional context. This perspective focuses on how regulations and welfare
provision affect the functioning of each institution, thus avoiding partial views
restricted to welfare provision only (services or cash). Our results suggest that
policies that promote de-familialization of care, via direct provision or by creating
the conditions for market provision, are powerfully associated with higher fertility.
A universal day care policy is likely to be a pre-condition for gender equality by
reducing the total amount of care done by families and favoring a more gender-
equal sharing of care and wage work.
Labor market policies that support a familialization of care offer less clear-cut
results. Policy strategies centered on women’s primary care responsibility, such as
part-time work, maternity leave or monetary support, show a weaker relationship
with fertility. Welfare state support to family care, even if they are temporary in
women’s life courses, still implies gendered costs of fertility. On the other hand, a
reduction in men’s standard working hours is associated with a sharp increase in
completed fertility, suggesting that working-time regulations have an important role
in men’s involvement in care. Institutional contexts and policies that provide
support to a dual-earner/dual-carer model are positively related to a higher fertility
level, with respect to policies that maintain a preferential care role for women.
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These results also highlight that existing policies support a variety of gender
relations, which cannot be reduced to a continuum between a male breadwinner–
housewife model and a dual-earner/dual-carer model.
In trying to discern the relationship between public policies and fertility, we should
pay attention to the existence of differentials in these associations by population
subgroup and the mechanisms involved in explaining such differentials. Here we have
hypothesized that the higher the level of gender-equality prevalent in the welfare
regime institutions, the less a woman’s educational level will be negatively associated
with fertility. The results of the analyses of the differential association between
policies and fertility according to the level of education show theoretically consistent
and statistically significant patterns. A positive association between education and
fertility was found for all of the indicators analyzed, which were particularly strong
for formal childcare, men’s standard working hours and gender norms. However,
contrary to our expectation, we find no evidence that a high prevalence of gender-
egalitarian norms in the population enhances the fertility impact of policies. This
result suggests that policies and norms are closely interrelated and that no strong
inconsistencies exist in the countries and cohorts studied (for instance, egalitarian
policies in a context with a predominant breadwinner–housewife model). Most
countries seem to be in a stage of the gender transition in which the breadwinner
model has been modified to accommodate women’s labor market participation, but
have not yet accommodated men’s caring role.
Overall, our findings are quite consistent with our theoretical expectations about
the impact of gender policies on fertility. Of course, our data had several drawbacks,
concerning in particular the suitability of the indicators available and the time lag
between the measurement of the context indicators and completed fertility. The
cross-sectional nature of the data used implies that no close relationship could be
made between changes in polices and changes in fertility behavior. This approach
involves the assumptions that our contextual variables do not change and that they
apply to the moment when women (or couples) decide whether to have a(n
additional) child. As we note in the section on data, the policies included in the
study are highly stable for the period considered. Furthermore, our choice of
analytical approach precluded us from undertaking an analysis of the timing of
births and involved that no distinctions between different parities could be made.
Some studies have suggested that first births are influenced by policies to a lesser
extent than subsequent births (Harknett et al. 2014). Therefore, an analysis that
would distinguish by parity would likely find lower relationship between policies
and first births and a stronger relationship with higher parities.
Analyzing policy indicators one by one has provided clear-cut results, in
particular concerning their interactions with education. However, the high
correlation between policy indicators suggests caution in interpreting each of their
individual effects in causal terms, since they are likely to be overestimated. An
alternative empirical strategy focusing on the effects of specific constellations of
variables would necessitate analyses of the situations of particular countries, which
was beyond the scope of our study.
In spite of these limitations, our analyses reveal that, depending on the policy
environment, fertility differentials reached about half a child, most notably when
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educational groups were considered. This is the order of magnitude of the existing
gap between countries with very low levels and those with sustainable fertility
levels. Although all educational groups seem to benefit from policies enhancing
gender equality, the highly educated benefits more. The rapid increase in women’s
educational levels observed in many European countries suggests a parallel increase
in the demand for gender-egalitarian polices, which is consistent with economic
considerations and with the higher prevalence of gender-egalitarian values among
the highly educated. The diffusion of egalitarian behavior from the highly educated
to the less educated could reinforce this trend. Furthermore, gender-egalitarian
policies provide an explanation for the convergence in fertility levels that has been
observed across educational levels in several countries. Following our arguments,
this convergence can be expected to continue. As we have shown, it is a process that
is fueled by policies that support the gender transition.
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